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24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Division, OSA

SUBJECT: Required Intelligence Support,  
IDEALIST and OXCART

REFERENCE: Memorandum from C/OD/OSA to C/ID/OSA,  
dated 19 June 1963; Subject: Same as  
above (IDEA 1317)

1. Re paragraph one of referenced memorandum:

ChiCom air defense capabilities which pose a threat to U-2 operations have been posted on the flight planning chart and will continue to be posted on the flight planning chart. Important data or reaction procedures, timing, and scrambling techniques against high altitude aircraft which pose a threat to U-2 operations have always been given to the IDEALIST section. Location and confirmation of suspect defense sites have been and will continue to be posted on the TACKLE planning charts. Updated information of new defense sites relative to U-2 operations have been and will continue to be given to the IDEALIST section. Specific North Korean defense information pertinent to U-2 operations has been maintained on the planning charts continually.

2. Re paragraph two of referenced memorandum:

Intelligence will further accommodate the operational planners if they are more specific in their

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requirements. It is obvious that an annotated chart including radar order of battle and other active/passive defenses is vitally important to SAC and low level missions. It has always been our policy to provide pertinent ROB and defenses relative to U-2 operations to the IDEALIST section. The radar detection boundary and the SAM sites are already on the planners maps.

3. Since the referenced document pertains to the Far East primarily, it seems to us at this time unnecessary to plot the locations of all fighter aircraft when none of them pose a threat to the U-2 operations.

4. For your information, to date, the only threat to the U-2 at mission altitude in Communist China is the SAM system. There is no evidence of any MIG-21s in China or any other aircraft which has a capability against the U-2.

5. If the Operations Division feels that any further information is necessary in order that the "functions of the Operations Division are to be accomplished in a professional manner" then they will have to be more specific in their requirements to Intelligence on exactly what information is required.

6. In the same context, let this memorandum be an official request to the Operations Division from Intelligence, for the Intelligence requirements relative to OXCART. At the present time, Intelligence is preparing documents on

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the minimum space and personnel required in addition to its present staff to support OXCART. We plan to include the radar order of battle, air order of battle, and SAM order of battle that is pertinent to the OXCART profile. If information is required in excess of the above to support OXCART mission planning, then the Intelligence Division must be notified immediately in order that it may plan for more space and more personnel. The Chief of the Intelligence Division will be glad to meet with the OXCART section to discuss these matters in the near future. We leave the time and the agenda up to Operations Division.

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Chief, Intelligence Division  
Office of Special Activities

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